Preliminary Programme

The last years of the “Golden Age” saw a sudden rise in the number of strike movements in Western Europe, a large share of them being non-institutional. Especially the general strike of may 1968 in France and the huge movement of autumn 1969 in Italy attracted a lot of publicity. Following these events, social scientist, especially sociologists, analysed the “resurgence of the working class”. But the demands and the groups involved were different from those of the working classes of the past. In contrast to traditional of a male-dominated working class groups of migrants and of low-paid women determined the strikes to an unprecedented extent, while, of course, white-collar workers and new generations of workers with new demands and no experience of the immediate post-war-struggles had an impact as well. As a result, a main feature of the strikes was not the “resurgence” of the old “working class”, but the challenging of the prevalent hierarchies on both the labour market and the shopfloor. At the same time, there were (partly successful) attempts to merge these strikes with struggles outside the factory, like protests against housing conditions. These corresponded more to social necessities at the time than being simple aspirations of political would-be leaders. As most of the strike movements were de facto illegal, initially without or only reluctant trade union support, the movements indicated a “crisis of representation” rather then an immediate re-composition of the collective identity of “the working class”.

Even in countries with “peaceful industrial relations” wildcat strikes occurred. The “post-war north European pattern” of strike movements, proposed by Tilly and Shorter in 1968, was put into question. Also in the FRG and Denmark, wildcat strikes articulated opposition not only against the wage-profit-ratio or working conditions but against the pattern of strike movements itself, including the centralisation of bargaining and the formalisation and de-politicisation of strike movements. In 1969, the “Septemberstreiks” (“September strikes”) in the FRG and the “En-krone”-strikes (“one-Kroner strikes”) in Denmark undermined both the income policy of the “Concerted Action” in Germany and the “wage restraint”-policy of the newly elected right-wing government in Denmark. Rather than securing the influence of big and strong centralised trade unions on governmental decisions, Keynesian government policies led to rank-and-file protest in both countries. One of the consequences was the introduction of a new reformist policy, highlighting the reformulation of older concepts of “Mitbestimmung” (“co-determination”) in the FRG and “oekonomisk demokrati” (“economic democracy”) in Denmark. Until about the beginning of the world economic crisis the attempted reintegration of the strike movements was unsuccessful. Even legal strikes were a source of discontent among the rank and file, often resulting in ballots which expressed deep frustration about the TU’s bargaining policy.

My paper will be discussing the impact of the wildcat strikes on industrial relations in the period up to 1973. The second point debated will be the long-term consequences of the strike movements of this period in the FRG and Denmark. Recent historical research and current research on new social movements will be discussed in my presentation. (Show less)

In recent years mobilisation theory has contributed to our understanding of the way workers’ readiness to adopt an adversarial approach towards management can often be seen to be critically dependent on the subjective element, the encouragement they receive from the minority of organised trade union activists within their own ranks. Union activists, it is suggested, play an important role in identifying grievances, persuading workers that collective action is the most appropriate means to seek redress, and legitimising such action in the face of counter-mobilisation by employers (McAdam, 1998; Fantasia, 1988; Gamson, 1992; Franzosi, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Kelly, 1998). However, historically there have always been commentators who have gone much further than this to argue that industrial conflict can be directly attributable to the intervention of left-wing ‘agitators’ and ‘troublemakers’ who fan the flames of discontent.

For example, in Britain in March 1912, Lord Robert Cecil in a speech in Parliament laid the blame for the pre-First World War upsurge in industrial militancy entirely on the activities of revolutionary syndicalist agitators (Brown, 1974), and the government’s own leading industrial conciliator stated: ‘The employment of active propaganda appeared to be the most important source of conflict’ (Askwith, 1974). Similarly, during the wave of industrial and political militancy that swept Britain during the early 1970s, government ministers, employers and even some national trade union leaders, encouraged by media reports, pinned the blame for the outbreak of strikes on Communist and Trotskyist industrial militants (Taylor, 1993; Economic League, nd; Rosewall, 1982). Even more recently, during the 2002 national fire-fighters’ strike in Britain, emphasis has, as in the past, been placed almost entirely on the alleged covert political objectives of ‘extremist’ strike leaders who appear to have a charismatic appeal capable of inducing blind obedience from otherwise rational workers. The implication is that if only these ‘subversives’ were not stirring things up workers would establish a harmonious relationship with management from which there would be mutual advantage. (Show less)

Major changes have occurred in the Argentinian labour movement since the “coup d’etat” of June 1966 to another one in March 1976. There have, for example, been dramatic developments in the level of struggles, the new role of the labour activists from the Interior (the Argentinian hinterland) as far from the Cordobazo (the popular uprising against the military dictatorship in the city of Cordoba in May 1969) and an intensification of the ideological struggle between the working class. And there have certainly been political changes, among others, for the time being eroded the Peronist orthodoxy in the labour movement.

There is a very great difference between interpreting these changes as an epochal rupture or on the contrary regarding them as the logic of a labour movement reaching maturity and independence. The answer to these questions in undoubtedly complex, but one major part of the answer in certainly generational – a generational shift.

What was distinctive about that period? The first thing is obviously the revolutionary ferment in Latin America during the 60s. The second one: the 60s Argentinian working class generation grew up at the end of the “labour golden age” - the Peronist era. And if there was ever a real historical shift in the Argentinian labour movement in the 20th century, it was the Peronist regime (1946-1955). Their main experience of this generation is the political struggle, the proscription and an economic expansion. The third element is the basic assumption that the working class is an agent of social change, a revolutionary change. (Show less)

Conventional political theory and historiography claims that Mexican labour became fully co-opted by the Mexican post-revolutionary leaders in the wake of the Mexican Revolution. The creation of the „batallones rojos“ (red batallions) in 1915 which „pitted worker against peasant [...], a pattern of behavior which was to be repeated time and time again in later years“ (B. Carr), is generally singled out as being the first step towards building corporative labour organizations in post-revolutionary Mexico. It is presumed that labour hereupon never recovered from this throttling embrace until the recent elections which marked the demise of the PRI-regime bringing the employer-friendly PAN (Party of National Action) into power through recognized democratic elections.
The continuously existing independent electricity worker’s union, the oilworker’s mobilizations leading to the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, the miner’s strike at the beginning of the fifties, the insurgency of the railway workers in 1958/59, the insurgencia obrera of the mid seventies and more recent events are but strong indications of Mexican labour’s „hidden transcripts“ (J.C. Scott) maintained in the face of a contradictory integration of official Mexican labour. Continuity of everyday resistance rather than sudden eruptions marks the history of Mexican labour and other Mexican oppositional forces alike.
These and other incidents of peasant and labour unrest show that the generally held belief of an „incorporated working class“ can only be upheld if class is conceived of as a sociologically descriptive category. If, though, labour is understood as a self-contradictory category which is independent creative human force confined in capitalist social relations as capital’s sole creator then labour’s disruptive power becomes conceivable through the mist of corporative social arrangements. Thus, corporative arrangements marked not the integration and standstill of class struggle (with occasional bursts of activities). Rather they constitute(d) the mediated form of the everyday existence of class struggle.
This paper will focus on the insurgencia obrera of the mid-seventies which will be discussed as an outcome of the „world revolution of 1968“ (I. Wallerstein) bringing about the (long drawn-out) demise of the PRI-regime, rather than being a singular incident in the history of Mexican labour. It marked the end of containment of labour in the form of Keynesian-style import substitution policies. The onset of neoliberalism will be discussed here as an attack on labour through credit rather than as a failure to comply with debt payments. Thus, monetarism is the attempt to regain power over labour which disrupted capital in the form of the insurgencia obrera. A brief assessment of the outcome of these struggles in the face of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994/95 will close the paper. (Show less)