Preliminary Programme

The development of political science in Turkey started with the French impact upon the intellectuals of Ottoman empire. Though the French and later the German schools have become quite very influential on the development of the discipline, the Anglosaxon tradition has been also visible in the literature since the late periods of Ottoman empire. In this paper I will compare and contrast these main traditons within the Turkish context. I will try to answer whether there is a relation between the political agenda of Turkey and the rise of one of this traditions with respect to the political changes. (Show less)

The histories of French and American political theory are usually thought to be profoundly divergent, drawing from different sources and privileging dissimilar methodologies. "James and Bergson: Antifoundationalism in Philosophy,"
examines the trajectory of William James's influence along a different path, tracing the linkages to the French theory of his time and ours. Gilles Deleuze, for example, profoundly resembles James in many respects, e.g., James's "lines of influence" between and within plural environments and Deleuze's "lines of flight" to explain similar episodic relationships. This is in part due to each philosopher's antifoundationalism, but the narrative relationship has greater complexity. Henri Bergson, the preeminent French philosopher at the turn of the 20th century (and an influence on later generations, Deleuze conspicuously
included) was himself profoundly affected by James, writing numerous letters and penning the introduction for the French translation of Pragmatism. They shared a mutual
admiration, giving lie to the purported "chasm" separating Continental and Anglo-American philosophy over the past century. This paper examines letters and papers between Bergson and James and their writings about one another, establishing their political and philosophical commonalities (and thus the interconnections between their intellectual descendants). (Show less)

By employing the rephrased concept of “historical generation”, originally developed by Karl Mannheim in the late 1920s, this paper sets out not only to describe but also to explain social and cultural change from a socio-historical perspective. It will argue that the formation of an historical generation in modern societies has to be considered as a social mechanism of cultural change at a macro-societal level. Consequently, it will put forward an interpretation of the Progressive Movement as one mainly propelled and advanced by a historical generation. Aware of the shortcomings shown by the cohort concept, an increasing number of scholars have taken to introducing anew the concept of historical generation into the discourse surrounding social change (Marshall 1984). Unlike cohorts which, per definition, continue to succeed one another year after year, the term “historical generation” stands for historically contingent social constructions. This means that a “generation nexus” (“Generationszusammenhang”) is likely to emerge only under specific circumstances of social change. According to Mannheim, this comes about on account of “historical events”. Furthermore, historical generations are conceived as collective actors. It is, however, important to realise that generations cannot act as an abstract whole. Generational action has to be mediated by particular spokespeople. In my paper, I attempt to link the generation concept with the current concepts of collective social actors, i.e. the concept of elite and the concept of social movement. Historical generations at the interface of biography and history are constituted by age-related social perceptions and novel situational interpretations. In the face of sweeping social crises – whether apparent or latent – they are most likely to emerge as innovative responses. These new responses are mainly concerned with normative orientations towards reconstructing the normative cohesion of the society in question. In order to bring about cultural change at a macro-societal level, new cultural values and orientations have to be politicised in society’s public domain.

From this perspective, the Progressive Movement will be interpreted as a historical generation. The Progressive era – with its core period falling between 1890 and 1916 – is conceived as a time of extraordinary social change and as one of the most creative phases in US history (Sklar 1988, Sklar 1992, Sautter 1991). In particular, this era saw the questioning of established paradigms, the principles of laissez-faire capitalism as well as the doctrines of Social-Darwinism prevailing during the “Golden Age”. It was the Progressives, rather than the unfettered regime of the free market, who were calling for the public community to take on new responsibility. They took a novel notion of regulating, administering and re-assessing collective action into the public debate, placing them within an American political framework (Chambers 1980). Later on, this new normative orientation came to impact on the New Deal to become one of the latter’s most basic approaches in the 1930s. And today, it remains an important cultural and political stand-point, despite constantly being challenged on the part of its liberal counterpart.

The formation of the Progressives‘ generation nexus is intimately bound up with the dire depression of 1893. This experience served as a major catalyst. The economic developments during the last third of the 19th century had, on the one hand, led to a concentration of capital and power to an extent previously unknown, and, on the other, to a mass of dependent employees having to suffer severe forms of dependency and misery. With divisions within American society becoming blatantly apparent and a large section of the population, particularly in new urban areas, being powerless and helpless, the established cultural doctrine one stressing the individual’s freedom and responsibility, came to be seen as quite absurd. Moreover, young journalists, the so-called “muckrakers”, had ample cause for sharply criticizing the reckless laissez-faire capitalism and the series of scandals dogging corrupt political parties. In response to the 1893 Depression, severe social upheavals shook society, causing a far-reaching social crisis as regards authority (Link & MacCormick 1983; Jackson Lears 1981). Whereas the establishment defended laissez-faire policies - by calling in the police and even the military – new political actors from acrosss a broad social spectrum expressed their discontent with the social state of affairs. Leading public voices challenged the established cultural regime, confronting it with new moral claims no longer addressed to the individual but rather to the community as a whole.

Classifying the Progressive Movement scientifically seems to pose difficulties on account of the phenomenon’s diverse nature. Some scholars even dispute whether it could be categorized as a singular movement (Rodgers 1982). For all the diversity, however, there are some important common traits. The new paradigms may be characterised as the “gospel of social-mindedness” and the “gospel of efficiency”, and both were being preached with consuming zeal. What is striking, furthermore, is that the actors spelling out the new paradigms all stem, to a large degree, from similar social and biographical backgrounds. Most important of all for my line of argument is that they are all of very much the same age. They were all born between 1855 and 1865 (Crunden 1982; Koppelberg 1896; Eisenach 1995). Most of those representing the Progressives shared the same middle-class Presbyterian background in the northeastern part of the USA and were influenced by the same institutional networks – specific colleges and universities (Crunden 1982; Eisenach 1995).

Strongly motivated by religious beliefs yet discontent with the intellectually sterile and socially marginal position of their church, members of the young elite were, as from the mid-1880s, seeking to engage satisfactorily with the “real world” in moral and vocational terms. Some turned initially held religious beliefs into secular pledges. They committed themselves to new forms of social work such as the settlement movement and devoted themselves to new sciences, particularly social science, as well as to new forms of journalism with which to denounce existing misery and social woes. The far-reaching moral claims were apparent right from the beginning. The commitment, however, was very likely to have remained limited to local circles concerned. Because of the 1893 crisis, the public sphere granted scope for a collective interpretation of the current times. Initiated and backed up by the muckrakers, diverse groupings and different movements joined up to form a single nation-wide movement, gaining a momemtum of its own in the years to follow. Social forces which had previously been latent manifested themselves as actors within a discourse in the public domain, thus defining the spirit of the time. (Show less)

This paper argues that the realism of Hans Morgenthau is both evolving and contingent.
Suggesting that the evolution of realism in the post war period is a function as much of the need for an intellectual underpinning of certain political postures of the United States in international affairs, the thesis outlines the use made of realism by policy-making elites in the furtherance of their programs. The paper suggests that the realism attributed to Morgenthau is may be partly understood as one individuals response to the times in which he lived and attention is paid to the intellectual development of Morgenthau himself. The argument is further made that the evolution of realism into neo-realism is not as sure and as direct as contemporary scholarship might suggest and that through his actions and writings that Morgenthau was not as supportive of the use made of his concepts and the policy implications drawn from his scholarship as has previously been believed. Recognizing that the richness of the though of Morgenthau is as much to be found in his other writings apart from Politics among Nations this paper pays some attention to these other works and asserts that Morgenthau developed his concept of realism in directions heretofore unconsidered by scholars. (Show less)