A consensus has prevailed among early modern social welfare historians that, at least up to the Civil War years, the Elizabethan Poor Law’s provisions allowed (encouraged?) ‘middling sort’ local magistrates and parish overseers to try to control the misbehavior of the poor often, it seemed, as an alternative to relieving ...
(Show more)A consensus has prevailed among early modern social welfare historians that, at least up to the Civil War years, the Elizabethan Poor Law’s provisions allowed (encouraged?) ‘middling sort’ local magistrates and parish overseers to try to control the misbehavior of the poor often, it seemed, as an alternative to relieving them. Keith Wrightson and David Levine made a compelling case for this in their Poverty and Piety in an English Village: Terling 1525-1700 (1995 [1979]), and Marjorie McIntosh’s Controlling Misbehavior in England, 1370-1600 (1998) rooted this syndrome in the suspicion of vagrants that intensified in the post-Black Death decades of the fourteenth century. A particularly hard-edged Puritanism is usually credited for the intense commitment to control in turn-of-the-seventeenth-century localities.
In this paper I will refract the moral discourses at play in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to demonstrate that attitudes toward the poor and their relief went beyond and even challenged Puritan social ethics. This will involve two stages of disentangling. In the first and briefest of these, I will distinguish the ‘reform’ discourse (essentially Protestant ethics) from Christian humanist ‘policy’ assumptions on poor relief. The two seemed to agree on important issues—curtailment vagrancy, liberality to the deserving poor, preservation of the social order—but were deeply divided by their contrary assumptions about human nature and the appropriate way to social concord.
The second and most important disentangling, however, is confined to the humanist canon. I will separate the feverish Cicero- and Erasmus-inspired civic involvement of the earlier sixteenth century from the ‘new’ humanism that begins to show in the 1580s. Centered on Seneca, it was prompted by the fascination with Tacitus’s disenchantment with government that Justus Lipsius and Michel de Montainge were articulating. The flow here was away from Ciceronian negotium and toward Senecan otium. I will draw heavily on De beneficius from Thomas Lodge’s 1614 English translation of Lipsius’s mammoth edition of Seneca and sketch the Third Way that the great Stoic offered to English readers. The ‘commerce of benefits’, Seneca’s own felicitous characterization, differed from humanist ‘policy’ and Protestant ‘reform’. It emphasized the arts of sociability not statecraft or control: the cultivation of friendship, mutual regard, dependence, liberality, and reciprocality. Oxbridge students’ commonplace books in these years reveal Seneca to be the most frequently cited writer on wealth, poverty, and charity.
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