Preliminary Programme

The literature on different business systems usually assumes that these are based in the broad culture of a country and were constructed historically and then remain relatively stable, despite globalization trends. It has identified different ideal types and very often contrasts German/Japanese with Anglo-American ones. This literature stresses the need for consistency within each system. When it comes to the flow of ideas across these systems, if it deals with it at all it highlight the need for adaptation. By contrast, the literature on Americanization has stressed that there has been actual changes within the existing systems, leading to a historical process of increasing convergence. Both perspectives are focused largely on institutions rather than actors, leading to a somewhat mechanistic, in the case of Americanization often teleological view of this process.
This paper looks at the origins of what is now seen as a specifically German management model – namely the participation of all stakeholders in decision-making and the responsibilities of managers towards employees and society as a whole. It will attempt to show that what is today perceived as typically German, was actually, in many circumstances adapted from the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-WWII period. In a nutshell, the paper will highlight that the adoption of the famous “social market economy” was the outcome of a complex process, which involved both “exporters”, i.e. the different Anglo-American agencies involved in the productivity and education efforts, and “active importers”, i.e. a wide variety of political and economic actors in Germany who were interested in learning from the American experience. More in general the paper will argue that many aspects of the German business system, seen today as “typical”, were historically constructed; i.e. resulted from specific constellations, sometimes even historical “accidents”.
Empirically, the paper examines in detail some of the channels through which the Anglo-American ideas were transferred and the changes which created some of the institutional foundations for the current German model. It looks in particular at the publication activities of an influential business association (the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft), the creation of executive training programmes (inspired by the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard Business School), and the introduction of co-determination at the supervisory board level in the coal and steel industries (by the British occupation authorities). (Show less)

This paper explores the interaction between party competition and the evolution of employer association in the process of democratization. The leadership for peak employers’ association development came from business-oriented party activists and bureaucrats, who sought both to advance industrial development policy and to solve specific problems of political control. Business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in both pre-democratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy and labor activism, and viewed employer organization as a useful tool for political control, to secure parliamentary advantage, and to serve as a societal counterweight to working class activism. The evolution of encompassing employers’ associations, in turn, had a feedback impact on the expansion of democratic institutions. (Show less)

Since the collapse of the Communist states in Eastern Europe attention has shifted from comparing capitalism and socialism to comparing different forms of capitalism, most notably in Hall and Soskice’s 2001 edited volume, The Varieties of Capitalism. In this framework Britain is presented as a liberal market economy (LME) in contrast to Germany and other continental European countries which are typically presented as coordinated market economies.

From the Varieties of Capitalism perspective Britain’s post-Second World War reconstruction is an interesting case study as it has been common to present this period as a missed opportunity to change Britain’s institutions to improve Britain’s post-war economic performance. In particular, Britain is seen to have adopted Keynesianism but, unlike Germany and other continental European countries, failed to adjust relations between the state, business and trade unions, with none of the three parties willing to sacrifice their independence. Thus free collective bargaining remained in place and the 1947 and 1948 Companies Acts failed to reform fundamentally the nature of British firms.

This paper will examine this picture by considering government policies to control dividends. This policy was related both to wage restraint policy and policy towards corporate governance. (Show less)

In all industrialized countries, institutions in corporate governance, or constituting cooperation among companies, in labor relations, or in the welfare state, experienced the economic effects of globalization. Since these institutions have their roots in the past and form part of a traditional set of cultural preferences, economic actors have an incentive to adopt them rather than to discard them.
The theory of Varieties of Capitalism offers a classification on the basis of 'coordination': Do economic actors coordinate their actions by using the market, or do they apply non-market coordination, such as organized consultation? This reveals the institutional characteristics of market economies, focusing on various subfields of institutions.
Surveying the second half of the twentieth century, it turns out to be impossible to fit the countries observed into the classification of ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ over a longer period of time. Technological development, liberalization as gradual transformation, and evolving institutions make the taxonomy unsuitable for application in a long time span: at first sight, the Coordinated Market Economy seems to become obsolete and all countries seem to huddle together in the category Liberal Market Economy. But this paradox, I will argue, can only be solved by re-defining the Coordinated Market Economy. Not all non-market coordination becomes obsolete, specific types of coordination adapted and survived. Redefining the parameters provides a fresh view on what changed and what remained the same. (Show less)