Preliminary Programme

The theoretical tradition critiquing the concept of sovereignty has been both deep and complex: from Bodin’s absolutism to Austin’s legal positivism to Schmitt’s constituent power, claims of legitimacy and alternative arguments against sovereignty have provoked a widely ranging literature. But a particular set of voices has repeatedly been excluded from the theoretical architecture of the Western world: that of Native American tribal groups, especially those within the contemporary borders of the United States.
This paper aims to promote an alternative conception on sovereignty, one based on conceptions of the Cherokee, Ojibwe/Algonquin, and Iroquois nations. Like western sovereignty, the right to collective self-determination proves central, but the diversity and varieties of the meanings of sovereignty diverge dramatically from European concepts. They contain, for example, an alternative relationship to geography -- one both seasonal and food-related -- and a conflicting model of consanguinity – one which privileges position and performance over patrilineal descent. Most importantly, these Indian ideas of sovereignty contained a different concept of political force, which generally attended to community decision-making rather than an isolated and hierarchical ruler or chief.
Through an examination of the 1677 Iroquois Five Nations Treaty, 1794 Treaty of the Six Nations, and a number of anthropological and historical accounts, this paper discovers a cohesive concept of sovereignty arising from the writings, actions, and practices of Native Americans.
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In the theory of citizenship it is well known that the citizenship is a form of social closure. Surely one of the main protagonists of such view has been Rogers Brubaker who in his book about Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany implemented the theory of social closure on the issues of citizenship. Following this path the main aim of our paper is to implement the theory of social closure on the issues of citizenship in Croatia-Slavonia in the period from 1868 to 1918.
In the abovementioned period Croatia-Slavonia has been semi-dependent entity within the Hungarian part of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The autonomy has been established in the internal affairs, worship, education and justice. Nevertheless, the autonomy hasn’t granted Croatian national citizenship. Instead, there was only one national citizenship for the whole Hungarian part of the Monarchy.
Since the Croatian national citizenship hasn’t been established the local citizenship has been used as a form of social closure. That citizenship has been regulated by special Croatian laws. These laws were in some basic principles similar to Hungarian laws but in some cases they regulated local citizenship quite different. The main difference has been the possibility of acquisition of local citizenship on the basis of long term residence. The possibilities of acquisition of local citizenship on that basis were much wider in Hungary than in Croatia-Slavonia. Considering the above, the local citizenship in Croatia-Slavonia has been much more closed. Analysis of the documents in the Croatian State Archives shows that the local citizenship has been used as a form of social closure to Hungarian poor and to Hungarian workers. That way the local citizenship functioned as a barrier to full integration of these people in Croatian society.
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In 1914, Britain declared war on Germany, thereby automatically bringing into the European conflict her colonial empire, and particularly these colonies which had been granted self-government in the second half of the 19th century. If these territories (Canada, Australia, New-Zealand, South Africa) only enjoyed limited self-government as they were still part of the British empire and depended on Britain as far as defence and foreign affairs were concerned, the fact that they were not consulted on the involvement of their peoples into the war stood at odds with the domestic sovereignty of their own parliaments and the political evolutions they had undergone prior to the war. The governments of these territories were then associated to the conduct of the war, with the establishment of the War Cabinet, but their status on the international scene remained blurred until well after the war. Indeed, their full sovereignty was somehow recognized on the international scene, as they, for example, signed the Covenant to the League of Nations in their own names, though their own legal status was still that of “self-governing colonies” or “dominions”. The latter term particularly had never been precisely defined, in part because of these territories’ own refusal to formalize a situation which was more prone to pragmatic evolution than a fully-fledged status. Their ambiguous attitude in this respect, even after the war, contributed to delay the recognition of their full independence until the Balfour declaration in 1926 and the subsequent Statute of Westminster in 1931. And even then, some of these territories’ reluctance to actually entrench this British statute into their own law tended to highlight the fact that the transition to full independence that WW1 had apparently precipitated, was not fully accepted by the peoples, raising questions about their own undetermined or dual national identities. This paper will therefore enquire into the impact of WW1 on the evolution of this autonomous part of the empire known as the British Commonwealth – which would later have further implication on the evolution of the colonial empire itself – and on Britain’s dream of a great imperial federation and to some extent, a somewhat different world order. (Show less)

Early Modern Europe and its colonies witnessed many regime changes and transfers of sovereignty, due to the endless series of wars, succession crises, territorial exchanges or even successful revolts against princes. Because each Early Modern regime needed a modus vivendi with its subjects (especially with the elites), most regime changes initially were characterized by a pragmatic policy towards new subjects. In every single case the interaction between new rulers and subjects can be situated somewhere between two extremes: on the one hand “continuity” as shown in the frequently adopted strategies of ratification of privileges, functionaries and representative institutions to ensure a smooth transition, on the other hand “change” either in the form of the generous bestowal of new titles or other favours or maybe even in the form of drastic measures curtailing existing rights and altering the political order. Elements of transition and continuity went hand in hand.
This paper discusses this tension for the transfer of sovereignty that occurred in the Southern Netherlands after the War of the Spanish Succession. By the Peace of Utrecht (1713), this conglomerate of more or less autonomous principalities was allocated to Emperor Charles VI, heralding eight decades of Austrian rule at the North Sea. More specifically, I concentrate on the various legitimizing strategies which Charles VI and his administration adopted in order to be recognized as the lawful new monarch. Tradition and continuity with the pre-war line of monarchs constituted a main element in the legitimizing discourse. Nevertheless, this continuity was not undisputed and did negate some of the ruptures during the War of the Spanish Succession. For example, the short reign of Charles’ predecessor Philip V of Spain, who had been Charles’ major opponent during the war, was deliberately ignored or heavy criticized. But also these facts were incorporated in the legitimizing discourse of Charles VI, who broached on other themes such as the proverbial softness of Habsburg rule as opposed to the absolutist rule of the French kings, or the display of the military ability of the emperor to protect his new subjects in the war-torn Netherlands. The quest for legitimization and acceptance was, however, only one of the challenges newly established regimes faced after a transfer of sovereignty. But it was a vital one, a prerequisite to gain authority and to successfully acquire a firm grip on a region.
By presenting the case of the Southern Netherlands, this paper aims at emphasizing the importance of (an alleged) continuity and of tradition for many of the early modern regimes that were established after transfers of sovereignty. The same holds even true for the many temporary military occupations. The weight of tradition and continuity supported transition, among other things by masking inconvenient aspects of discontinuity. Moreover, this legitimization was not a purely top down propaganda, rather it developed in a communication process with the subjects. Focusing on this process and on the often difficult initial phase after regime changes, can help to characterize the nature of early modern rule. (Show less)