Preliminary Programme

The contribution of British Marxist Historians such as EP Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm are well known. However, the major history of British trade unions from 1889 to 1951, building on the Webbs classic 1894 work, was by Hugh Clegg, a Pluralist Industrial Relations academic. Published by Oxford University Press, this history stressed the moderate, institutional character of British trade unions and the role that employer and state support for collective bargaining played in this rise to power and influence (see Clegg et al 1964, Clegg 1985, Clegg 1994). This, with Clegg's other writing on trade unions and trade union history, provides an important antidote to the heroic view of British Labour History of a series of battles against capitalism. Clegg is often dismissed as an empiricist, piling up detail, but this paper argues that he presented an important revisionist account of trade union developments which remains of enduring importance. (Show less)

France and Germany display two different cultures of labour unrest and industrial action. Whereas France is widely depicted – not least in Germany - as a country of public protest and industrial militancy, German industrial relations are usually associated with social partnership and labour quiescence. Beyond these stereotypes however the reality in both countries is much more complex. Industrial conflicts in both countries have undergone considerable changes in recent years. Both countries demonstrate that strikes express different things depending on time and circumstances and that strike activity cannot be straightforwardly attributed to either the strength or weakness of the work force. The paper aims at identifying differences and commonalities in French and German strike activity by examining quantitative and qualitative developments since the 1990s.

(Show less)

While strike numbers are historically low in the West, strikes in the new ‘workshop of the world’ – China – are becoming more common (van der Velden et al. 2007; Chan 2009). The interdependent nature of factories in the car industry, exacerbated by local and global just-in-time supply practices, makes them peculiarly vulnerable to stoppages in one factory. The series of strikes in Honda’s Chinese factories in May and June 2010, followed by ones at Toyota, achieved notoriety at the time and generated academic articles (e.g. Chan and Hui 2012). Writers particularly concentrated on the role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and how this could be changed rather than the dynamics of the strikes themselves, which this paper concentrates on.

The pivotal strike at Honda Foshan, brief and limited on 17 May, then more widespread from 21 May to 4 June – was the key event because of the government’s decision to allow press coverage early on and then through the use of an outsider in its settlement. It had been preceded by four strikes in June and July 2009 and then three in January, two in February and four in March 2010, most also in Guangdong province. It was followed by a strike by a partly-Honda-owned supplier on 7 June, lasting three days and winning a wage increase. Before this had finished, another Honda component company, employing mainly young women, struck for a week but achieved only a relatively low increase. Three other short strikes at Honda suppliers followed on consecutive days. Simultaneously, there were short strikes in two factories (one affiliated to Honda and another to Toyota) outside Guangdong, starting on 17 June. In the next week there were further strikes in Guangdong at a core Toyota supplier and a Honda supplier. Aftershocks occurred in July with at least three supplier factory strikes (two Honda, one Toyota), one lasting ten days.

Two China-based researchers involved in collecting data for this paper went as assistants of Professor Chang Kai, in his role of labour adviser to the Honda Foshan strikers, and took notes of the final negotiations with the company. They later interviewed 19 Honda Foshan workers, 9 local union officials and a local government official in 2010 and 2011; and 5 Toyota Tianjin workers and a government official in 2010. Further interviews (involving one of the UK-based researchers) were conducted in 2012 (2 Honda; 4 Toyota). Given the security environment in China, the interviewees were not randomly chosen. The researchers approached some of the workers involved in the Honda wage negotiation, who then introduced other colleagues. The Toyota workers’ interviews followed an introduction to one worker.

As well as interview data we have accounts presented in (mainly American and Chinese) newspapers and other outlets (such as the China Labour Bulletin and reports from the IHLO (Hong Kong Liaison office of the ICFTU/GUF) and in secondary literature (which also used interview evidence). Reports in some Western media are often not original, while official Chinese media are clearly censored or self-censored, but overall there is much material. Any inconsistencies identified in accounts of events will be explored by telephone discussion of earlier interviewees.

Given the ACFTU’s anti-strike stance and the ban on independent unions, the strikers acted as if they were unorganized, i.e. non-union. The IR literature concentrates on strikes by unionized workers and says little about unorganized workers’ strikes. Labour history, though, is replete with examples of striking non-unionists whose initial demands rapidly add that of union recognition (e.g. Lyddon 1993). What happens when they don’t or (as in the current Chinese cases) can’t do that? Ross (1954: 24) indicates that they form ‘ad hoc organization … which often disappeared when the strike had ended’. Hiller provides a useful template for understanding strike process, while observing the ‘place of residence’ as one means of workers making contact; that ‘[e]ven a spontaneous strike has to be started by someone’; and that the ‘timidity’ of unorganized workers sometimes requires them being ‘coerced’ into stopping work (Hiller 1928: 47, 61, 63). Warner and Low (1947: 37) show how strikers going into the factory can talk non-strikers out of continuing work. In terms of strike outcome, the success of one group of strikers can encourage other groups, the ‘demonstration effect’ (Hyman 1989: 135, 226).

We can make some early observations on the Honda Foshan strike. It was started by two individuals who were prepared to lose their jobs, which they did, but it reflected the popular demand for significantly higher wages, though rapidly a long list of other demands was drawn up. Consensus was facilitated by the links between the workforce of mainly young unmarried men through the dormitory system, in this case not an instrument of control by the companies (see Smith and Pun: 2006) and, within the factory, the initial strike was spread by sending mobile phone text messages.

Once the strike became more general, one unusual feature was the workers going (and being allowed) inside the factory every day. While management attempted to make life uncomfortable for the strikers, the latter’s presence made it easier to deal with any non-strikers without having to confront them outside the factory. The management made several offers to end the strike, which now involved between 1,500 and 2,000 workers. Attempts to intimidate ‘interns’ among the workers and a public confrontation of strikers with drafted-in union ‘heavies’ led to an ‘open letter’ being issued electronically and the strikers contacting a professor to act as their adviser. His status and his proficiency in Japanese gave him a unique role in what is probably best described as a form of third-party ‘conciliation’.

The next two Honda strikes were motivated not just by the success of the Foshan strike but also by its consequence. The shutting-down of four Honda assembly plants meant that other supplier plants were stopped, with inadequate compensation to workers, who responded by demanding lay-off pay and pay parity, as in the 1970s British car industry (Lyddon 1996). Wage successes fed off one another to encourage further strikes though their results were uneven.


Chan C., ‘Strike and Changing Workplace Relations in a Chinese Global Factory’, Industrial Relations Journal, 40:1 (2009), pp. 60–77.

Chan C. and Hui E., ‘The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade Union Reform in China: The Case of the Honda Workers’ Strike’, Journal of Industrial Relations 54:5 (2012), pp. 653–68.

Hiller E. T., The Strike (University of Chicago Press: 1928).

Hyman R., Strikes (4th edn; Macmillan: 1989).

Lyddon D., ‘“Trade Union Traditions”, the Oxford Welsh and the 1934 Pressed Steel Strike’, Llafur 6:2 (1993), pp. 106–14.

Lyddon, D., ‘The Car Industry, 1945–79: Shop Stewards and Workplace Unionism’, in Wrigley C. (ed.) A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939–79 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 1996).
Ross A., ‘The Natural History of the Strike’, in Kornhauser A. et al. (eds), Industrial Conflict (McGraw-Hill, New York: 1954).

Smith C. and N. Pun, ‘The Dormitory Labour Regime in China as a Site for Control and Resistance’, International Journal of Human Resource Management 17:8 (2006), pp. 1456–70.

Van der velden S. et al. (eds), Strikes around the World: Case-Studies of 15 Countries (Aksant, Amsterdam: 2007).

Warner, W. L. and J. O. Low, The Social System of the Modern Factory – The Strike: A Social Analysis (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT: 1947).
(Show less)

It is common knowledge that strike data is highly unreliable. This is a big problem when studying longitudinal strike developments or comparing national or regional developments. The way data is collected and presented by national statistical bureaus is also inconsistent.
In collaboration with others at the IISH we are looking for a solution to these problems.
There have been attempts to build own datasets of labour conflicts. The most extensive of these is the World Labor Research Working Group (WLG) Database. The database was constructed by recording all occurrences of labor unrest mentioned in the indexes to two Western newspapers. The results were published in 1995 and Beverly Silver relied firmly on these in her provocative book Forces of Labor.
The main problem with the WLG database is that it is based on the indexes of only two Anglo-Saxon newspapers. Its strength, however, is that it covers all kinds of labor protest. This cannot be said of official strike statistics, which cover only strikes and lockouts. Contrary to the recommendations adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians, most national statistics do not even distinguish between strikes and lockouts, let alone provide data on other forms of protest.
Because the data published by the ILO is often inconsistent from one country to the other new consistent statistics must be compiled. Only then will it be possible to construct a valid overview of international strike activity. This new data must of course also prevent the Eurocentrism of the WLG.
Building a global dataset on labour conflicts using data digging
At the IISH we have started a new project. With this project we aim at building a dataset on labour conflicts on a global scale. The data for the database will be extracted from already digitized historical sources. The extraction will be done with software enabling us to find raw unstructured data concerning labour conflicts. And then this unstructured data will be structured with newly developed and sophisticated software. With the results of this project the study of labour conflicts enters the innovative world of digital data mining which replaces the old-fashioned world of manual data search.
(Show less)

Studies on the strike volume in the 1990s and early 2000s found evidence for a continued pattern of declining but still diverging strike rates across Western Europe (Edwards and Hyman 1994; Scheuer 2006). This is also the strike picture that was painted up until the first two years of the current recession (Gall 2012; Vandaele 2011). The strike volume continued to decline in Western Europe on an even wider scale than before, although less sharply than in the previous decades. Meanwhile, considerable cross-country differences in strike levels remained intact. Has the strike volume fallen further after the austerity drive of the European governments? Using the most recent data on the strike volume (days not worked (DNW) due to strikes per 1,000 employees), this paper will argue that European countries are moving along the same trajectory – labour quiescence – but that there is no outspoken convergence trend. Although some other European countries have occasionally seen general strikes in their streets, such strikes tend to be geographically concentrated in the southern part of Europe (including France), albeit to a lesser extent in Portugal (Hamann et al. 2012); this partly explains the persistent cross-country variation in strike patterns since large strikes tend to dominate the strike volume. However, further analysis of the strike volume – by making a distinction between industry-wide strikes and political mass strikes (Gall 2012) – reveals that political mass strikes are no longer dormant in countries with single-employer bargaining systems like Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland and the UK; almost everywhere, they were prompted by the governments’ austerity measures. Although the effectiveness of the mass strikes in terms of alleviating the austerity packages has been largely questioned in the mainstream media, participation in strikes and collective action in general may change ‘the ways in which people think about the economy, about the role of governments and markets and about their own interests, as employees, consumers and citizens’ (Kelly 2012:26).

(Show less)