Preliminary Programme

Wed 30 March
    8.30 - 10.30
    11.00 - 13.00
    14.00 - 16.00
    16.30 - 18.30

Thu 31 March
    8.30 - 10.30
    11.00 - 13.00
    14.00 - 16.00
    16.30 - 18.30

Fri 1 April
    8.30 - 10.30
    11.00 - 13.00
    14.00 - 16.00
    16.30 - 18.30

Sat 2 April
    8.30 - 10.30
    11.00 - 13.00
    14.00 - 16.00
    16.30 - 18.30

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Wednesday 30 March 2016 16.30 - 18.30
T-4 THE03 Narrative Explanations and Historical Objectivity
Salon de Grados, Nivel 1
Network: Theory Chair: Berber Bevernage
Organizer: Karsten Stueber Discussants: -
Paul Roth : Reviving the Philosophy of History
In my talk I will address the following two questions: first, what exactly would a revival of the philosophy of history revive; and, second, why bother? Those skeptically inclined might counsel indefinite postponement, inasmuch as this subfield has remained mostly deserted since the 1970s. My primary concern will be to ... (Show more)
In my talk I will address the following two questions: first, what exactly would a revival of the philosophy of history revive; and, second, why bother? Those skeptically inclined might counsel indefinite postponement, inasmuch as this subfield has remained mostly deserted since the 1970s. My primary concern will be to outline the current status of key issues raised by the first question, for the purpose of identifying those aspects within philosophy of history that both merit and demand renewed philosophical consideration. In particular, my paper reconsiders questions tied to the use of narrative as a form of explanation. Specifically, I focus on those features that make historical explanation distinctive and yet belong on any satisfactory catalogue of explanatory strategies. I directly address an epistemic question that I take to be of central philosophical concern, viz., in what respects explanations in narrative form can be said to offer credible justifications. Answering this requires a turn away from narrative theory and back to neglected works by Arthur Danto and Louis Mink, since their work provides important and still crucial insights that can be deployed to fashion answers to philosophical concerns about narrative explanation. I will conclude with two examples of what I claim to be exemplary explanations in narrative form. (Show less)

Karsten Stueber : The Cognitive Function of Narratives
In this talk I will explore narratives uniquely epistemic contribution to our understanding of the world. It is a mistake to focus only on narratives about human agency if one intends to grasp a narrative’s specific explanatory power. Nevertheless, I maintain that we have to utilize the central historicist insight ... (Show more)
In this talk I will explore narratives uniquely epistemic contribution to our understanding of the world. It is a mistake to focus only on narratives about human agency if one intends to grasp a narrative’s specific explanatory power. Nevertheless, I maintain that we have to utilize the central historicist insight about the nature of the historical world and historical writing in articulating the cognitive function of narratives. Full-blown narratives are best understood as developmental portraits of a chosen entity/ unit in respect to its individuality. The argument will proceed through a critical analysis of the debate between Noel Carroll and David Velleman about the nature of the narrative connection and the question of whether the explanatory force of a narrative has to be understood in causal or emotional terms. I will side with the causalist in this respect but will also show that we need to be very careful in distinguishing between causal explanations underwritten by a theory and the use made of such causal accounts within the context of narratives concerned with explicating individuality. Accordingly, I agree with Mink that narratives are special cognitive instruments. Yet Mink’s characterization of narrative understanding as a “configurational mode of comprehension” that is strictly distinguished from the theoretical mode needs to be amended. Narrative understanding should be conceived as an autonomous and irreducible mode of comprehension. At the same time, it should be viewed as being dependent on a variety of theoretical perspectives it intricately uses. I will conclude by pointing to a number of distinguishing marks of narratives about human agency. (Show less)

Eugen Zelenak : Non-representationalist Evaluation of Historical Narratives
In the debates about the nature of history it is possible to identify two alternative accounts of historical works. According to representationalism historical works should be viewed as representations of past events, whereas non-representationalism claims we should reject such an account and analyze historical works in other terms, namely, in ... (Show more)
In the debates about the nature of history it is possible to identify two alternative accounts of historical works. According to representationalism historical works should be viewed as representations of past events, whereas non-representationalism claims we should reject such an account and analyze historical works in other terms, namely, in terms of certain practices – argumentative, discursive or constructive. Although their respective views on the issue of evaluation of historical works are not always explicitly formulated, it is clear the two positions should differ here as well. Advocates of realist versions of representationalism typically prefer those narratives that correspond better to pre-existing past realities. Proponents of non-representationalism, however, cannot embrace the same criteria. In my paper I try to formulate their alternative view concerning evaluation of historical narratives. First, I briefly discuss the main tenets of the two accounts of historical works. Then, I turn to what realist representationalists say about criteria for evaluation of historical narratives. Finally, I focus on two contemporary advocates of non-representationalism and discuss their own views on evaluation. I articulate their alternative criteria and compare them with those of representationalism.In the debates about the nature of history it is possible to identify two alternative accounts of historical works. According to representationalism historical works should be viewed as representations of past events, whereas non-representationalism claims we should reject such an account and analyze historical works in other terms, namely, in terms of certain practices – argumentative, discursive or constructive. Although their respective views on the issue of evaluation of historical works are not always explicitly formulated, it is clear the two positions should differ here as well. Advocates of realist versions of representationalism typically prefer those narratives that correspond better to pre-existing past realities. Proponents of non-representationalism, however, cannot embrace the same criteria. In my paper I try to formulate their alternative view concerning evaluation of historical narratives. First, I briefly discuss the main tenets of the two accounts of historical works. Then, I turn to what realist representationalists say about criteria for evaluation of historical narratives. Finally, I focus on two contemporary advocates of non-representationalism and discuss their own views on evaluation. I articulate their alternative criteria and compare them with those of representationalism. (Show less)



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